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Book Reviews
ADVANCE TO BARBARISM-HOW
WARFARE AND WAR-TRIALS

THE

REVERSION TO BARBARISM

MENACES OUR FUTURE,

IN

by F. J. P.

Veale. C. C. Nelson Publishing Company, Appleton, Wisconsin, 1953. Pp. xvii, 305. $4.50.
The subtitle of this book, "How the Reversion to Barbarism
in Warfare and War-Trials Menaces Our Future," purports to
show its principal themes. The "reversion" in the conduct of
warfare is ascribed mainly to the leading nations allied against

Germany in the two World Wars. Germany and German leaders
(both pre-Nazi and Nazi) run a poor second and, indeed, in a fair
number of cases German leaders come off with unsullied reputations as the defenders of "civilized warfare." The second aspect
of alleged "reversion" is the conduct, under various Allied
auspices, of war crimes trials of both German and Japanese

leaders after World War II (WW II). These trials are heralded
as having left in ruins the principles of justice and as assuring
horrors in future wars beyond all precedent. In developing his
two points, or in going beyond them, the author engages in broad
speculation on the specific causes of particular wars, on the
motives of notable leaders on sundry domestic and international
topics, and on numerous other questions of greater or lesser
import.

The author, in the tone of a man upholding a neglected mission and demanding to be heard, punctuates his "facts" with
satire and vituperation and passes readily from facile conclusion

to quick condemnation as he jumps back and forth in man's
history from the Stone Age to the Korean War. If many of the
main arguments of this book were not tied so painstakingly and
repetitively to the aggression and other misbehavior of Soviet
Russia, the American edition would most likely meet as unrespon-

sive a reception as did the original English edition, according to
the author's own admission.' But in the context of the "cold war,"
1. Speaking of the original 1948 English edition, the author states that
"the bulk of the British press, newspaper and periodical alike, rigidly ignored
the appearance of Advance to Barbarism. Not one London newspaper with a
nation-wide circulation reviewed the book at all." (p. xii) The author
attributes this (to him) painful fact to what he calls the "Iron Curtain of

Discreet Silence" and "The Historical Blackout" of the time.
[447]
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many of the contentions and methods of this book will be met
again and again. They are worth inquiring into because they fit
into an all too common pattern of persuasion employed to catch
the unwary and to confuse and distract those seeking sober assessments of our difficult problems, including the task of meeting
2
the continuing threat of communist totalitarianism.

I.

"PRIMARY" VERSUS "SECONDARY" WARFARE

The author early develops several broad concepts concerning warfare which are later employed freely to bolster a number
of his principal conclusions. From the time of the first dynasty
in Egypt to the present, the author divides warfare into two
types, "primary" and "secondary." "Primary warfare" covers
all wars "between combatants at different stages of civilization"
whereas "secondary warfare" characterizes all wars between
combatants "at the same or approximately the same stage of
civilization." The author early asserts that "[m]ost of the really
important wars of history have been primary wars," and that all
wars between combatants of about the same civilization "are in
essence only civil wars," (p. 23) regardless of the fact that most
modern wars have involved nation states. With but few exceptions, such as the invasions of Europe by the Mongols and the
Turks, all European wars since the Dark Ages "must be classified
as secondary wars," (p. 51) and hence as civil wars.
This definition of civil war leads the author to classify wars
since the time of Louis XIV into European Civil Wars No. 1
through No. 8b. (pp. 54, 56) The author states that the First
It remained a civil war
World War "is a plain misnomer ....
and the United
Powers
[Japan
although two non-European
States] joined in." (p. 56) The war which broke out in 1939
"was really only a continuation of the struggle which it was
believed ended" in 1918; hence "the war 1914-1918 should be
labelled European Civil War No. 8a, and the war 1939-1940 European Civil War No. 8b.3 The war 1940-1945 really merits the title
of the First World War since during it, for the first time in history, continents came into conflict rather than mere countries."
2. The nature of the author's presentation invites a great many quota-

tions. To avoid numerous short footnotes to the pages at which the book is
quoted, the quotes in the text will be followed by the page numbers in
parentheses.
3. Several times the author abbreviates his new concept as "E.C.W.
No. 8b."
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(p. 56) 4 Why the author chooses 1940, when no new nonEuropean countries became involved in the war, as the beginning of his "First World War," instead of 1941, when Germany
invaded Soviet Russia and declared war upon the United States,
is confounding and will be examined further below.
II.

"CIVILIZED WARFARE" WITH LIMITATIONS

Another important concept projected by the author is "civilized warfare." He states that from the dissolution of the Roman
Empire to the Middle Ages, warfare was "conducted with the
most primitive savagery." (p. 41) In the Middle Ages, however,
"chivalry had considerable influence on the conduct of warfare
...although the influence was generally restricted in practice to
dealings of the ruling classes with each other." (p. 61) In the
eighteenth century the author finds that "wars ceased to be
waged for vague undefined objects in a frenzy of emotion," but
instead were fought "for limited objects" and "with limited
means, that is to say, the means employed to wage them were
limited according to a for long unwritten but generally recognized code" later known as "civilized warfare." (p. 65) 5 In defining this term, the author states that "The exclusion of noncombatants from the scope of hostilities is the fundamental distinction between civilized and barbarous warfare." (p. 128) "So
long as warfare in Europe continued to be warfare between
Europeans, it was conducted in accordance with a recognized
code." (p. 75) However, "Europeans have always in practice
refused to admit that any rules which might exist governing
European civil war had any application to Asiatics," (p. 86) and
as to Asia, "methods of warfare have remained completely unchanged throughout the ages." (p. 87)6 "All appeared well, so
4. The author makes no reference to the participation of various nonEuropean components of the British Commonwealth, such as Canada, South

Africa, and Australia, in "the war 1939-1940."
5. The author idealizes war during the Age of Reason to no inconsiderable extent, stating that "the result of such wars could be awaited with
indifference. The actual fighting would be done by long-service professional
soldiers recruited from the dregs of the population-the scum of the earth
as the Duke of Wellington frankly described them-guaranteed from acting

otherwise than as machines by a ferocious discipline enforced by repeated
flogging, led by officers who under no circumstances would forget that they
were gentlemen first and officers afterwards." (p. 79)
6. The author concedes a number of exceptions to his European code
even in the fighting between Europeans. However, in summary he states:
"During the greater part of the eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth, a rigid code of conduct was generally observed by the armed forces
of the European countries, or, at least, when disregarded, was paid the
tribute of indignant denials." (p. 3)
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long as no non-European Power existed strong enough and presumptuous enough to take advantage of these European civil
wars" and "so long as these civil wars were conducted in a comparatively good-humored spirit." (p. 137) But at the turn of the
century, for reasons the author believes to have discovered, this
condition began to deteriorate, "and the conditions of warfare
reverted within the space of fifty years to their original pristine
simplicity and barbarism." (p. 4)
III.

THE COMPARATIVE ROLES OF LEADING MODERN STATES

IN THE "REVERSION TO BARBARISM"

It is revealing of the author's analysis and beliefs, and perhaps of his motives, to gather and group a fairly large number
of his statements roughly according to the role played by leading
modern states or by their political leaders.
A. Germany-1870 to 1914
The author declares "that the peoples of Europe benefited
by the German victory over France in 1870," (p. 98) and that
thereafter Germany "preserved unbroken peace" in Europe for
more than forty years while Germany's neighbors engaged in
various "aggressive wars." Coming to World War I (WW I) the
author finds that "the two main immediate causes of the first
World War" were "the Russian desire for the Straits leading out
of the Black Sea and the French desire for the return of AlsaceLorraine." (p. 103) In a footnote the author states:
"Of course, the mercurial behavior and flamboyant rhetoric
of the Kaiser were no true reflection of his attitude toward
war in the concrete. When it came down to brass tacks in
the summer of 1914, he hned up on the side of peace, but too
late to check the rush to hostilities. His boasts and bravado
were, actually, far less of a menace to peace than the personal antipathy of Edward VII to Germans generally and
to the Kaiser in particular, and Edward's secret intrigues
with the French." (p. 103)
B. Germany-The Nazi Period
The author's discussion of the conduct and motives of Hitler
and the Nazi leadership during the entire period of the Third
Reich contains a startling collection of half-truths and serious
errors matched only by the author's omissions. The author finds
that "Hitler's primary object was to free Germany from the
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chains of the Versailles Diktat. From the first, world hostility
had to be taken into account. As Gbring put it, 'Guns are more
important than butter.' Throughout the short existence of twelve
years of Nazi dominion, this saying was indisputably true." (pp.
271-272) Hitler "by threats of force set aside one by one the main
provisions of the Versailles Treaty." (p. 114) The German invasion of Austria in March 1938 is not called an act of force nor an
aggression. The appeasing of Hitler at Munich is not criticized,
nor is Hitler's breach of the Munich Agreement mentioned.
Indeed, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 is passed
over entirely.
Coming to the fateful summer of 1939, the author sees Hitler
as wanting merely to rectify the wrong of the Polish Corridor.
Both Germany and Poland are viewed as "convinced that the
other must be bluffing"; (p. 115) and hence came another
"typical European War" offering "no features of general interest
except that the point at issue was rather more frivolous than
usual." (p. 116) Apparently the author accepts Hitler's public
pretenses and chooses to overlook Hitler's confidential statements
to his top assistants and generals. The author needed only to
read the decision of the International Military Tribunal at Ntirnberg to find such Hitler statements as the following, quoted
from contemporaneous German documents:
"Now Poland is in the position in which I wanted her ....
I am only afraid that at the last moment some Schweinehund
will make a proposal for mediation." (Speech to Com7
manders-in-Chief, August 22, 1939)
And:
"It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not
be satisfied with the Sudeten German territory. That was
only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia
was made. Then followed the erection of the Protectorate
and with that the basis for the action against Poland was
laid, but I wasn't clear at that time whether I should start
first against the East and then in the West or vice versa."
(Statement to Supreme Commanders on November 23, 1939)8
7. 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military
Tribunal 201 (Niirnberg 1947) (hereinafter Trial of the Major War Criminals
before the I.M.T.).

8. Id. at 189. A collection of contemporaneous German documents concerning the aggression against Poland may be found in the official series:
Trials of War Criminals before the Niarnberg Military Tribunals (1949-

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XI'V

C. Great Britain-"The Splendid Decision" to
Employ Strategic Bombing
At the first page of his Preface the author states: "Previously [i.e., prior to the revelations and discoveries in the 1948
edition of his book], it had been universally assumed that Hitler
was solely responsible for the air Blitz over England and the
natural retaliation for this by the Allies over the Continent."
(p. xi) At many points throughout this book we are told that, on
the contrary, the British were responsible both for the Blitz and
for the employment of strategic bombing generally with its horrors to non-combatants in large cities. This' the author traces to
"The Splendid Decision" which led to a bombing mission by
eighteen British bombers over Western Europe on May 11, 1940,
a raid supposedly directed at German railway installations. It is
not pointed out that this raid occurred the day following the
German invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, nor is the event related to past Nazi offenses. Instead, the
author proceeds to dispute with those who have asserted that
the Allied bombing of civilian centers "was only a reprisal for
the German bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdam." (p. 123) Here
the author does succeed in finding a quotation in his support,
quoting Captain Liddell Hart's conclusion that these German
bombings "'did not take place until the German troops were
fighting their way into these cities and thus conformed to the
old rules of siege bombardment.'" (pp. 123-124) Thus sharply
distinguishing between Nazi warfare within the rules and this
preliminary incident of British strategic bombing, allegedly
outside the rules, the author proceeds to drive home his point
and concludes that the British bombing "was an epoch-making
event since it was the first deliberate breach of the fundamental
rule of civilized warfare that hostilities must only be waged
against the enemy combatant forces." (p. 122) 9 "Their flight
marked the end of an epoch which had lasted for two and onehalf centuries." (p. 123)
1953) (hereinafter: Trials of War Criminals); 10 id. at 642-711 (1951) and 12
id. at 995-1081 (1951). These documentary collections are taken, respectively,
from the evidence in "The High Command Case" and "The Ministries Case,"
two of the Niirnberg trials subsequent to the trial of G6rlng et al. before
the International Military Tribunal.
9. The bombings of civilians by the German "Condor Legion" during the
Spanish rebellion in 1937 and 1938 is, of course, not mentioned. See Taylor,
Sword and Swastika, Generals and Nazis in the Third Reich 135-136
(1952).
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D. Great Britain-Refusal to Make Peace with Hitler
The author declares that the escape of the larger part of the
British Army at Dunkirk was possible only because of "Hitler's
delusion" that Britain would come to its senses and give up the
war to protect itself from the "menace of Asia." (p. 220) The
author finds that the German victors were so intoxicated by the
speed of their triumph in France that they "were in no mood to
set about paying off old scores." (p. 116) At the surrender at
Compi~gne the Germans followed "military etiquette" punctiliously, and thereafter Hitler, full of a desire for peace, offered
peace to Britain. But Britain's reply was "sulky silence" (p. 119)
and further strategic bombing of Europe. Speaking of the good
faith of Hitler's peace offer, the author has, as usual, a ready
answer: "We need not consider whether this offer was sincere,
since any other course from his point of view, would have been
madness. He had achieved all and much more than all he had
set out to achieve and Germany lay under the shadow of the Red
Army." (p. 119)
Any who have given more than a casual glance to the captured German documents of the Nazi period must stand aghast
at such trifling with the motives and planning of this conquering
dictator and his collaborators. 10
E. Germany and Soviet Russia
After ending his "European Civil War No. 8b" with Britain's
refusal to enter a "Hitler Peace" in mid-1940, the author confronts substantial difficulties in getting his "First World War"
(1940-1945) started in 1940. After all, Hitler did not invade
Russia until June 1941 nor declare war upon the United States
until December 1941. The author attempts to overcome this
obstacle by disregarding it along with numerous pertinent historical facts. Although he states that "[i]mmediately hostilities
had started, the U.S.S.R. set about realizing far-reaching plans
for expansion at the expense of Europe," (p. 118) he fails to
note that Germany gave Soviet expansion plans their initial
chance for concrete realization by Germany's achievement of the
Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939. This Pact
10. Concerning various phases of Nazi Germany's planning and expansion,
an extensive collection of translated captured documents is reproduced in
Trials of War Criminals along with testimony of various German participants, many of whom were defendants in the Niirnberg trials. See particularly 10 Trials of War Criminals ("The High Command Case") Section VI
(1951) and 12 id. ("The Ministries Case") Section VI (1951).
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was accompanied by a "Secret Additional Protocol" setting forth
the boundaries of the "spheres of influence" to which both Nazi
Germany and Soviet Russia would adhere "in the event of a
territorial and political rearrangement in Eastern Europe."" To
Hitler this was a second Munich, and he promptly went forward
with the invasion of Poland as previously scheduled and let
Soviet Russia expand into Eastern Poland and the Baltic states
as contemplated.
In his text the author speaks several times of the "entry" of
Soviet Russia into the war, but not of the fact that Germany
invaded Russia. However, this matter is given the quick treatment in a footnote focused upon the Molotov-Hitler conferences
of November 1940. Declaring that Hitler rejected Molotov's
demand for a "protectorate over the whole of the Balkans" as
the price for continued neutrality in the war, the author concludes that Hitler thenceforth "regarded a Soviet attack on
Germany as merely a question of time and, nine months later,
wisely or unwisely, decided to forestall this attack before the
United States was ready to take an active part in the war."
(p. 119) The German-Italian invasions of Albania, Greece, and
Yugoslavia in 1939, 1940, and 1941 are passed over entirely in
the author's analysis of the beginnings of his "First World War."
Instead, our attention is diverted to Britain's position after the
fall of France. The author states that thereupon "two urgent
problems arose for the consideration of all Europeans-first,
whether domination of Europe by the Soviet Union was too
heavy a price to pay for the continuance of the civil war, and
secondly, if this price was not too heavy, by what means was
the war to be continued." (p. 119) According to the author,
Hitler (presumably deciding for "all Europeans" then under the
Nazi heel) was ready to make the proper election, but embattled
Britain took the wrong turning, along with the numerous European governments in exile. The author's capacity for apologizing
for the Nazi leadership is illustrated by a remark he makes concerning the Pact for the Outlawry of War and the Nazi leaders
in the dock at the first Niirnberg trial:
"It is a curious fact that the Kellogg Pact could have been
more logically invoked in defense of those accused at Ndirnberg than exploited for their condemnation." (p. 182)
11. Reproduced in 12 Trials of War Criminals 1046 (1951).
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F. America-Its Contributions to "Total War" and
the Trend Toward "Orwellian Warfare"
Speaking of General Philip H. Sheridan's visit to Prussia in
1870 during the Franco-Prussian war, the author quotes an alleged
remark of Sheridan to Bismarck:
"You know how to hit an enemy as no other army does, but
you have not learnt how to annihilate him. One must see
more smoke of burning villages, otherwise you will not finish
off the French.' 2 (p. 94)
On the concept of "total war," the author states that "[t]he first
extensive example of this departure from the European code of
civilized warfare was the strategy of Lincoln and Grant in the
American Civil War" (p. 80) when the North considered both
effective and legitimate "the destruction of the enemy's economic
resources." (p. 90) Groping for the reasons for this, the author
finds that "[t]he North had endured much more bellicose contact with the Indians and was much less influenced by Europe
than the South. The latter was culturally a European colony
until after the Civil War. . . ." (p. 89)
With respect to WW I, the author declares that America
entered "at the end mainly for the purpose of safeguarding the
huge loans which she had made to Great Britain and France to
buy munitions." (p. 56) Other possible reasons for America's
entry are not even mentioned.
Particularly toward the end of this new "Book of Revelations," the author makes a great number of statements and innuendos about American Presidents, American economic and political problems, and the relation of both to American participation
in WW II and contemporary international affairs in general.
Again it seems safest to quote directly from the book. "It is possible to claim that Franklin D. Roosevelt was the first statesman
in history to realize that such economic problems as overproduction and unemployment could be most readily solved in a
modern state by the adoption of a war economy .... Harassed by
strikes and the opposition of business interests,... it may well be
that his thoughts turned with longing to conditions in which
emotional engineering could function most effectively. . . . The
selection of an enemy thus became for him an economic neces12. No citation is given for the source of this alleged remark, a failure
which is noteworthy with respect to many of the "facts" marshalled in this
book.
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sity." (Italics supplied.) (pp. 272-273) The author asserts it to
be a "fact that the Nazi Government had persistently ignored
the various acts of provocation designed by President Roosevelt
to involve the United States in the Second World War," (p. 180)
and also that "[f]ailing in his efforts to provoke Hitler into
hostile action, Roosevelt adopted an actively aggressive policy
against Japan." (p. 274) Further, "Whether or not as a result
of a reasoned resolve, it is unquestionable that, not later than
1938, Roosevelt adopted a design for war." (p. 273) 111 Even
before the European war began, Roosevelt "had succeeded in
bringing about what would now be called a 'cold war' with Nazi
Germany." (p. 274) This increased the production of munitions
and supplies and "quickly solved the problems of over-production
and unemployment. Incidentally, of course, they saved the President's waning political fortunes and those of the Democrat [sic]
Party." (p. 274) "It is probable that, being the supreme opportunist that he was, he was quite content to solve his problems
for the moment and to leave their final solution to his successors.
... Must it be assumed that it was beyond his ability to realize
that the Soviet economic system depended on the existence of
an enemy, and once 'Fascism' had been eliminated, 'American
Imperialism' would be adopted to serve this necessary role in the
Soviet scheme of things? The Englishman, William Joyce, the
Lord Haw-Haw of German propaganda broadcasting, constantly
stressed the fact that even a child could realize that a war
between the United States and the Soviet Union would be the
inevitable result of Germany's defeat." (Italics supplied.) (p.
274) Speaking of the Orwellian trend toward "the establishment
of a permanent war economy and a state of continuous cold or
phony warfare," the author states:
"Some may find it hard to believe that this trend has developed as a result of deliberate discussion and philosophical
formulation. In the United States, at any rate, it is an opportunistic affair, set in motion by that supreme opportunist,
Franklin D. Roosevelt, and revived on a large scale by
President Truman in March, 1947, when he instituted the
'cold war.'" (p. 281)
13. In leading us to this "unquestionable" conclusion, the author does not
trouble with evidence or documents of the time. However, when Roosevelt
sent Hitler his telegram requesting a "minimum period of assured nonaggression" on April 15, 1939 (just one month after Hitler had invaded
Czechoslovakia), Hitler and Goebbels quite. likely did consider this effort at
pacification as a part of America's "design for war." The Roosevelt document is reproduced in 12 Trials of War Criminals 1003 (1951).
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Coming to the developments after WW II and the growing
antagonism and distrust of the victors, the author declares:
"Ultimately Truman let loose a cold war which may well provide
the entry into a hot third World War." (p. 294)
No attempt will be made herein to list the grave omissions
in the author's speculative and accusatory analysis of American
efforts to meet the expansionist policies and the actual aggressions of totalitarian powers before, during and after WW II.
Needless to say, the author does not suggest, much less discourse
upon, any specific remedies to the continued aggressive acts of
Nazi Germany and Militaristic Japan before and during WW II.
Nor does he impugn Hitler's "Lebensraum" objectives in any
way. And although the author would like to appear to be second
to none in speaking of the menace of further expansion by Soviet
Communism, he nowhere proposes specific alternatives to the
general course which America and the Western Powers have
evolved in their attempt to curb aggression in the present "cold
war." However, in concluding his remarks on the trend toward
"Orwellian warfare" and the horrible results of a possible third
World War, the author gives us, all in one lump, his general
strategem:
"The real lesson to be drawn from all this is that, if we
wish to escape from either the tyranny, intimidation, and
austerity of a 'Nineteen Eighty-four' r6gime or reversion to
the living conditions of the cave men, we must repudiate
the cold-war strategem and imposture of 'perpetual war for
perpetual peace,' and return to national sanity, diplomatic
neutrality, and truly pacific internationalism." (p. 284)
The author does not give his view of the elements of "national
sanity, diplomatic neutrality, and truly pacific internationalism."
Nor are we told how, in our time, the people and leaders of either
the Western Powers or the Iron Curtain countries are to "return"
to these conditions. Nor are we informed of when or where these
conditions existed so as to plot our "return."
G. Striking a Balance on the Atrocities of Nazi Germany
and the Countries Allied in World War II
This book steers away from the discussion of specific atrocities committed by the Nazis and from any analysis of the
original orders, implementing directives, and other contemporaneous German reports on German atrocities and crimes against
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humanity. Nor does it seek to bring into focus the ideological
and "racial" characteristics of the Nazi regime which bred mass
murder and other outrages in Germany, beginning in 1933, and
in all territories occupied by Germany after 1938. This is not to
say that the author does not admit that Nazi atrocities did occur
on a broad scale, for early in his Preface he seeks to assure his
readers that he is "fully aware of the nature and extent" of
Nazi barbarities. He immediately adds, however, that "the
emotional reactions to these Nazi outrages" led to acts of the
same nature and to results "more horrible and destructive than
the worst acts" committed by the Nazis. (p. xiv) Further, he
concludes that atrocities were "about equally distributed between
the Nazis and their opponents" and, indeed, that the Nazis have
already been "outdone" in their wrongdoing. (p. xv) Having
ventured this far, the author then proceeds at numerous points
throughout the book to attempt to undo the record of German
atrocities in various ways and to shift responsibility. "The originally comparatively friendly relations between the inhabitants
of the occupied countries and the occupying forces had gradually
disappeared as the resistance movements, organized and financed
by Great Britain and the United States, increased in strength
and daring." (pp. 153-154) Again we find that accusation that
the British bombing mission of eighteen bombers over Western
Germany in May 1940 tore away the keystone of civilized warfare "and, with the keystone removed, the whole structure of
civilized warfare . . . collapsed in ruins. The assumption became
general that a war waged by barbarous methods must inevitably
end in a barbarous peace. Faced by this appalling prospect,
each side felt any act justified, providing only that it served even
remotely to stave off defeat. As the war proceeded and the prospects darkened, this became more and more openly the German
attitude. The entry of the United States and the Soviet Union
accelerated the headlong decline of civilized warfare, since, as
non-European Powers, neither felt in any way bound to observe
the rules of civil war adopted by the European aborigines." (p.
128) In connection with this explanation of the downfall of
European "civilized warfare," we meet another of the principal
concepts developed earlier by the author, that of "primary warfare":
"The entry [sic] of the Soviet Union into the war, of course,
completely transformed its original character .... The cam-
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paigns on the Eastern Front were primary warfare in its
grimmest aspect." (pp. 128-129)
In connection with the horrors of warfare and occupation in
Russia, fairness would require some reference to the "Commissar
Order ' 14 and the "Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order,"'15 and to the
fact that these orders, with their provisions for "liquidation" of
all who might be suspect of opposition to German occupation,
were issued and implemented before the German invasion of
Russia. But the author mentions neither these orders applied in
Russia nor the "Night and Fog Decree"' 6 applied in occupied
Western Europe. In discussing the systematic killings in German
occupied territory, and especially in discussing the Kesselring and
Manstein trials, (pp. 213-214; 235-236) the author comes to the
defense of Nazi policy and practice by invoking, in summary
fashion, the "hostage" and "reprisal" doctrines of international
law. Readers interested in an analysis of the restrictive conditions
and extensive safeguards to be observed before these doctrines
may legally be employed, are referred to u7the judgment of the
Ndirnberg Tribunal in "The Hostage Case.'
IV.

THE WAR CRIMES TRIALS

Both Mr. Justice Jackson and General Telford Taylor, the
chief prosecutors for the United States in the Niirnberg trials,
have admitted the likelihood of mistakes and inadequacies in
these trials and have invited fair criticism.'8 It is the more discouraging, therefore, to find this book particularly wanting in facts
and fulsome in error in taking to task the Allied nations for the
holding of war crimes trials after WW II. Given the predilections which the author demonstrates on many subjects, this abuse
14. Reproduced, with implementing directives, in 10 Trials of War Criminals 1054-1064 (1951).
15. Id. at 1113-1131.
16. 11 Trials of War Criminals 195-217 (1950). See also 3 id. ("The Juotice
Case") at 774-804 (1951).
17. 11 id. at 1243-1256 (1950). See also the judgment In "The High Command Case," id. at 528-529.
18. In his final report to President Truman on the first Niirnberg trial
11r. Justice Jackson's final words were: "In pursuit of it [his assignment as
Chief of Counsel for the United States] many mistakes have been made and
many inadequacies must be confessed. I am consoled by the fact that in
proceedings of this novelty, errors and missteps may also be instructive to
the future." See Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative
to the International Conference on Military Trials (hereinafter International
Conference) 440 (Dep't State publ. 1949). And General Taylor has stated
that the "Niirnberg trials merit far more discussion and analysis than has
thus far been accorded them." See Taylor, The Krupp Trial: Fact v. Fiction,
53 Col. L. Rev. 197 (1953).
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would not be worrisome if the author did not discourage his
readers from any attempt to pursue historical facts on their
own' 9 and if he did not fail completely to cite any of the official
records of the war crimes trials or the official reports concerning
them. Accordingly, it seems appropriate hereinafter to supply
some of the source materials for independent research while
dealing with a few of the author's principal assertions.
A. Origins of War Crimes Trials
At the first page of his Preface the author asserts that the
1948 edition of this book mentioned "for the first time" a number
of important matters, including "the fact that the origin of the
war-crimes trials can be traced to the proposal of Stalin at the
Teheran Conference in 1943" that a liquidation similar to the
Katyn Forest Massacre should follow Allied victory. (pp. xi-xii)
Having alleged such a discovery, it is not surprising that the
author fails to mention such pertinent historical facts as the
following: the recommendations of the Inter-Allied Commission
on the Responsibility of the War (WW I) in March 1919; Articles
228-230 of the Treaty of Versailles providing for the trial of war
criminals of WW I before military tribunals; the deliberations of
a number of official and semi-official bodies between WW I and
WW II on the establishment of an international criminal court
to supplement the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague; the St. James Declaration of
January 13, 1942, by which the representatives of nine of the
countries allied in WW II (not including Russia) placed "among
their principal war aims the punishment, through the channel
of organized justice," of those guilty of war crimes by issuing
orders, by perpetration, or by participation; President Roosevelt's
Declaration of October 7, 1942, that American policy aimed at an
armistice providing for "the surrender to the United Nations of
war criminals" and that America was ready to join with other
Allied governments "in establishing a United Nations War Crimes
Commission for the investigation of war crimes" with the object
of eventually establishing the criminal responsibility of individuals; the favorable Allied reaction to President Roosevelt's over19. "Except to students of the customs, practices, beliefs, and ideas of
primitive man, the details of this unique trial [of Gbring et al. before the
International Military Tribunal] need not concern anyone who values his
time." (p. 2) On the other hand, the author states a little later that "It is
assumed that the reader is sufficiently familiar with the details of the Niurnberg proceedings of 1945-1946, so that there is no need to point out how
closely primitive precedents were unconsciously followed in them." (p. 14)
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ture and the formation, without Russian participation at any
20
point, of the United Nations War Crimes Commission.
B. The First Niirnberg Trial
In discussing the trial of Gbring and twenty-one other leaders of Nazi Germany before the International Military Tribunal
(hereinafter I.M.T.) at Niirnberg, the author speaks of "Niirnberg with its collection of foreign hangmen" (p. 79) and declares
that in such trials "the object was not to ascertain the truth but
to secure a conviction." (p. 149) According to the author, the
defendants were deprived "of the protection of the rules of evidence" (p. xv) and under the I.M.T. Charter the Tribunal
"could admit 'any evidence which it deemed to have probative
value,' that is to say, might help to support a conviction." (pp.
148-149)
From the beginning of official American consideration of the
trial of Axis war criminals, the official documents show genuine
concern for the matter of full and fair trial, 21 and from the
start of his important role in this field Mr. Justice Jackson
declared that the purpose of any trial would be "to determine
the innocence or guilt of the accused after a hearing as dispassionate as the times and horrors we deal with will permit, and upon
a record that will leave our reasons and motives clear.' 22 (Italics
supplied.)
The rules of evidence as well as the rules of criminal procedure generally 'vary widely, of course, between countries
employing the adversary system (Great Britain and the United
States) and the accusatorial system (followed with variations on
the European continent). The author does not tell us which of
"the rules of evidence," even as he may choose to understand
them, were followed at Niirnberg and which were not. Nor are
we referred to the deliberations at the London Conference in
1945 when the troublesome task of evolving a workable procedure
occupied the greater part of many sessions of the conferees prior
20. For both source materials and commentary concerning the matters
listed and related developments which the author omits to mention, see
History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development
of the Laws of War, cc. III-V (London 1948) (hereinafter History UNWCC).
This official work is nowhere referred to by the author. A short summary
of the "Origins and General Nature of War Crimes Trials" appears in Taylor,
Nilrnberg Trials, War Crimes and International Law, 450 International Conciliation 244-256 (1949).
21. See, for example, Sections I and IV of International Conference.
22. Report of Mr. Justice Jackson to President Truman, June 6, 1945,
International Conference 42. 46.
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to the signing of the London Agreement, to which was annexed
the Charter of the I.M.T.2 3 The record of the London Conference
is illuminating to any student genuinely interested in the development of international legal machinery of any kind, for it demonstrates the unavoidable problems inherent in any composite set
of rules which draws from several legal systems and still attempts
to satisfy the basic expectancies of jurists of several nationalities
with different training and experience in procedural matters.
Needless to say, there were trying arguments with the Soviet
and, to a lesser extent, the French representatives on the functions of the tribunal and the prosecution, the rights of the defense,
and many other matters. But the procedures evolved 24 resulted
in a division of responsibility between court and counsel closely
parallel to that of our adversary system, with the burden of
going forward placed clearly upon the shoulders of counsel
rather than upon the court as is generally true under the accusatorial system; in the representation of the accused by learned
counsel; in the right of defendants to take or not to take the
witness stand under oath; in the right of the defendants to
address the tribunal when not under oath, a practice borrowed
from the accusatorial system; in elaborate procedures for the
discovery of evidence on behalf of the defense; in months of
court sessions dedicated to receiving hundreds of uncontested
contemporaneous German documents and to the hearing of
testimony; in a large number of written motions and rulings as
well as lengthy arguments in open court by both prosecution
and defense; in a soberly phrased decision and judgment of the
tribunal; 25 and in a dissent by the Soviet member of the tribunal
to practically all the acquittals of accused individuals and of
26
accused organizations.
In commenting on the procedure before the I.M.T. and the
I.M.T. judgment, the author for the most part avoids analysis of
23. The minutes of the sessions of the London conference as well as the
text of preliminary drafts and the final agreement are set forth in "International Conference." Mr. Veale simply declares that the I.M.T. charter was
"framed by cynical politicians and dominated throughout by a righteous
indignation complex." (pp. 170-171)
24. The basic "Rules of Procedure" adopted by the I.M.T. are reproduced
in 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the I.M.T. 19-23 (1947) and in

15 Trials of War Criminals 18-22 (1953). The evolution of uniform rules of
procedure in the 12 NUrnberg trials following the I.M.T. case is shown by a
comprehensive compilation of materials from the NUrnberg court archives
reproduced in 15 Trials of War Criminals ("Procedure, Practice and Admin-

istration") Sections III-V (1953).
25. 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the I.M.T. 171-341 (1947).
26. Id. at 342-364.
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the specific procedures and practices at Niirnberg. Rather he
states: "It is no matter of surprise that the proceedings ended
with a mass-hanging of the prisoners." (p. 156) The Niirnberg
defendants "found themselves subjected to a protracted ordeal
leading to a result which everyone assumed from the start was,
in the circumstances, inevitable and which may well have come
to many of the accused as a welcome release." (p. 166) "It must
freely be admitted that the stage management at Ntirnberg was
excellent, far superior to that of many of the series of mocktrials which have been such a prominent feature of Russian
political life under the Stalin regime." (pp. 184-185) If a Patagonian "had visited the Court during the proceedings, he might
well have imagined that normal judicial processes were in operation-provided, of course, that he did not tarry too long. It would
be outside the scope of this book to trace the course of the proceedings, to examine the various charges made, and to speculate
on the reason why there was a departure from orthodox practice
in disposing of certain of the prisoners." (p. 185)
But having asserted that the trial result was cast in advance,
the author does not tell us that three of the twenty-two defendants tried were acquitted on all counts; that from two to thirteen defendants were acquitted under the individual counts; and
that the tribunal refused to declare as criminal three of the seven
organizations so charged.27 The author's "mass-hanging" broadside attack is made without noting that of the nineteen convicted defendants three were sentenced to life and four to imprisonment for a term of years.
Speaking of the German defense counsel at the I.M.T. trial,
the author states that the tribunal was "protected against embarrassment" from undue professional zeal "since only anti-Nazi
barristers were then permitted to practice in Germany," since
"the prisoners could choose counsel only from among their
political enemies," and since German counsel could "instantly be
sent to join the unhappy multitude of persons then being detained
in concentration camps" of the Allies. (p. 163) These are fabri27. Defendants Schacht, von Papen and Fritzsche were acquitted on all
counts. As to Count One (Conspiracy) 8 of 21 charged were found guilty.
As to Count Two (Aggressive War), 12 of 15 charged were found guilty. As
to Counts Three and Four (War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity), in
each case 16 of 18 charged were found guilty. The tribunal refused to declare
as criminal organizations the Reich Cabinet, the Storm Troops (SA), and the
General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. The tribunal
also prescribed its declaration of criminality as to the other Nazi organizations charged: The SS, SD, Gestapo and Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party.
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cations. A number of the defendants, including Gring, asked for
particular counsel and such requests were approved. Moreover,
most of the defense counsel in all the Nilrnberg trials were
members of the Nazi Party, the SS, the SA, or other affiliated
organizations of the Nazi Party, and there was no showing that
the accused thought of their counsel as "enemies.

'2

Indeed, no

one familiar with the records of the Niirnberg trials can seriously
question the zeal and aggressiveness of defense counsel. During
the I.M.T. trial Dr. Marx, counsel for the defendant Streicher,
called the attention of the I.M.T. to an article in the German
newspaper "Berliner Zeitung" in which Dr. Marx was criticized
severely for his conduct in cross-examining a prosecution witness
and was threatened with ostracism in the future. The I.M.T.
reprimanded the newspaper in open court, stated that it desired
"to say in the plainest of language that such conduct cannot be
Germany
tolerated," and asked that the Control Council for
29
"investigate the facts and to report to the Tribunal."
C. War Crimes Trials in General
The author's discussion of specific war crimes trials deals
mainly with the I.M.T. trial, which concededly was the principal
precedent for later trials, at least insofar as the Western Powers
were concerned. There is no discussion of any of the other twelve
trials held in Nuirnberg 80 and no analysis of the detailed procedures evolved during those trials.3 1 The scholarly reports of
the United Nations War Crimes Commission on a large number
of war crimes trials go without mention.3 2 Although a few pages
are devoted to several trials held elsewhere than at Niirnberg, the
28. Concerning the role of defense counsel at Niirnberg, see 15 Trials of
War Criminals ("Procedure, Practice and Administration") Section XIII-G,
pp. 302-338 (1953). General Taylor has reported in summary form on this
topic in his "Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Niirnberg
War Crimes Trials under Control Council Law No. 10" 46-49 (1949). This
report includes tabulations showing the background and political affiliation

of the Niirnberg defense counsel. Id. at 297-343.
29. Session of March 5, 1946, 8 Trials of Major War Criminals before the
I.M.T. 532-533 (1947); 15 Trials of War Criminals 336-337 (1953).
30. Principal materials from the records of the 12 Niirnberg trials subse-

quent to the I.M.T. are reproduced in the 15 volume series, Trials of War
Criminals (1949-1953).
31. For a comprehensive compilation of procedural materials on the
Niirnberg trials as a whole, see 15 Trials of War Criminals ("Procedure,
Practice and Administration") (1953). The materials from the records of the
various trials in this volume are grouped topically and show the development
of adjective law at Niirnberg over the course of nearly four years.
32. 1-12 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (London: published for
the United Nations War Crimes Commission by His Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1947-1949).
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author for the most part is content with summary conclusions
concerning what he prefers to call "war-trials." For example, he
finds that "Throughout Europe, there began, in 1945, what in
essence amounted to but thinly disguised dances around the
torture stake" (p. 201) and that "during the eighteen months
which followed the termination of hostilities, no less than 24,000
war-trials in various parts of Europe are said to have taken
place." (Italics supplied.) (p. 202) The source of this minimum
figure is not given.83 The author does not appear to distinguish
between war crimes trials of foreign nationals and trials of a
country's own nationals for treason or collaboration with the
Nazis (such as Quisling in Norway and Laval in France). The
author finds it convenient for his purposes to lump into one big
bundle genuine war crimes trials (patterned at least generally
after the NUrnberg practice) and "trials" held or executive action
taken with respect to alleged war criminals in Communist countries. But at least insofar as concerns the score of democratic
nations which were signatories or adherents to the London Agreement, the full and fair trial of Nazi war criminals was intended
to fortify the principles of democratic justice and to lay bare
3' 4
the pretenses of totalitarian "justice.
Concerning the precedent set by the war crimes trials, the
author sees only dire results. These trials, he says, "assured that
in future wars defeated leaders and generals would be shot,
hung or otherwise liquidated." (p. 80) This canard cannot stand
the most meager analysis of the judgments of the thirteen Niirnberg trials in which were tried the larger part of the top German
leaders who faced trial before tribunals of the Allied countries.
But as already noted, the author makes erroneous insinuations
33. In tabulating available statistics concerning war crimes trials, the
United Nations War Crimes Commission readily admitted the difficulties of
accurate statement because "No statistics are available regarding war crimes
trials in Russia, the Soviet Zone of Germany, or in Hungary, Roumania or
Bulgaria." From data available as of March 1, 1948, the commission lists 962
war crimes trials as having been conducted in Europe by the United States,
Britain, France, Greece, the Netherlands, and Norway. See History UNWCC
("Statistics of War Crimes Trials") 515, app. IV.
34. For example, in his final report on the I.M.T. trial, Mr. Justice Jackson
stated: "It is not too much to hope that this example of full and fair hearing,
and tranquil and discriminating judgment will do something toward strengthening the processes of justice in many countries. . . . It has been well said
that this trial is the world's first post mortem examination of a totalitarian
regime. . .. The Niirnberg trial has put that handwriting [that destruction
of liberty eventually destroys the offending government] on the wall for the
oppressor as well as the oppressed to read." International Conference 438-439.
One of the later NiIrnberg trials was devoted exclusively to the prostitution
of justice in Nazi Germany. See the materials in 3 Trials of War Criminals
("The Justice Case") (1951).
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concerning the sentences passed in the I.M.T. case, and he skips
the twelve later Niirnberg trials completely. In this latter group
of trials, 177 persons stood trial. Of these, 142 were convicted on
one or more counts; 35 were acquitted on all counts. Of the 142
convicted, 26 were originally sentenced to death, 20 to life imprisonment, and 98 to a term of years. Sixteen were sentenced
to a term of less than four years, and 11 of these were released
immediately after judgment by virtue of "credit" for the time
already spent in confinement before and during the trial. 35 In
the two exclusively "military" trials, in which twenty-two generals and one admiral were tried, none of the defendants was
sentenced to death, and four were acquitted.8 6 Apart from the
I.M.T. case, there were death sentences in only three cases, and
each of these involved the doings of the infamous SS and plain
murder.3T Statistics, admittedly, are no substitute for reasoned
analysis of the judgments and records of these trials in passing
upon the measure of justice reached, but an interesting feature
is that the tribunals, collectively, held 1,321 daily sessions in the
88
twelve trials.
Critics have raised points concerning the war crimes trials
which indeed bear further reflection with a view to the strengthening of international penal law. The matter of judges of victorious nations sitting in judgment of the members of vanquished
nations for violations of international law is indeed unfortunate.
Its only justification was that no established and permanent judicial machinery was at hand to ascertain guilt and invoke sanctions. Further, the codification of international law by treaty
and convention left much to be desired then, as it does now. In
this connection His Holiness, Pope Pius XII, has recently declared
35. A large number of these sentences have since been commuted or
reduced. For materials on the review of sentences by the Military Governor

and the United States High Commissioner for Germany, see 15 Trials of
War Criminals ("Procedure, Practice and Administration") Section XXV
(1953).

36. Of the 19 convicted on one or more counts, 4 were sentenced to life
imprisonment and 15 to imprisonment for a term of years. A number of
these sentences have since been commuted or reduced. See "The High Command Case" and "The Hostage Case," 10 and 11 Trials of War Criminals
(1951 and 1950).
37. See the "Medical," "Pohl" and "Einsatzgruppen" cases, 4 and 5 Trials
of War Criminals (1950).
38. Three hundred eighty-three sessions were devoted principally to the
case of the prosecution and 924 to the defense case. In the shortest trial,
"The Milch Case," with a single defendant, there were 39 daily sessions. In

the longest trial, "The Ministries Case," there were 169 daily sessions. For
a table on the length of the respective cases, see 15 Trials of War Criminals
451 (1953).
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the vital importance of establishing "a uniform penal code between states" providing for a court with jurisdiction over such
crimes as the "making of a modern war which is not required by
absolute necessity or self defense" and the taking of reprisal
actions against innocent people.3 9 But lacking such permanent
international machinery, the danger of future war crimes trials
of victors over vanquished is not that the precedents of Niirnberg
will be followed but that they will not be followed.
Drexel A. Sprecher*
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MORRIS ON

"... they studiously avoid entering into the merits of
the cause but are loud, violent, and tedious in dwelling upon
all circumstances which are not to the purpose. For instance,
in the case already mentioned, they never desire to know
what claim or title my adversary hath to my cow; but
whether the said cow were red or black, her horns long or
short, whether the field I graze her in be round or square,
whether she be milked at home or abroad, what diseases she
is subject to, and the like; after which they consult precedents. . . ." A portion of Gulliver's explanation of the English
legal system to the chief of the Houyhnhnms.
First year law students, not having even the governmental
experience of the chief of the Houyhnhnms, have more difficulty
in understanding the devious methods of the courts in expounding
and administering the law of torts. Professor Morris has done
an excellent job of explaining the classic torts and the trial
process by means of parable and policy just as did Gulliver, but
without the satire, thereby accomplishing his primary purpose
of aiding his colleagues in the assignment of outside reading for
beginning students as well as his secondary object of benefiting
the practicing advocate. With these as his public the author
practicably solves the perennial problem of how much emphasis
39. Address to the Sixth International Congress of Penal Law on "An
International Code for the Punishment of War Crimes," October 3, 1953,
translation reproduced in full in 28 St. John's L. Rev. 1 (1953).

* Member of the Wisconsin, District of Columbia and Maryland Bars.
Assistant Trial Counsel, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Niirnberg, 1945-1946. Division Chief and Deputy

Chief Counsel, Office, United States Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, Niirnberg, 1946-1949. Editor-in-Chief, "Trials of War Criminals before the Niirnberg Military Tribunals." Associate Chief Counsel, Salary Stabilization Board,

1951-1952. Assistant Administrator, Small Defense Plants Administration, 1952.

